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ii. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENTON W. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SHARON S. STEPHENS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20437 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this Appeal are: 
1. That the Court abused its discretion by awarding to 
the Respondent $400.00 a month alimony and upon retirement 
of the Appellant, that the $400.00 shall represent Respon-
dent's share in the retirement of the Appellant from his 
employment at Morton-Thiokol and previously at Sperry-Rand, 
which constituted pure speculation on the part of the Court 
as to what the Plaintiff's retirement may or may not be. 
2. That the award of $400.00 a month alimony to the 
Respondent, who is gainfully employed and has a substantial 
income, to be paid alimony in the sum of $400.00 a month and 
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not abating until the Appellant shall have retired or died 
was an abuse of discretion, in that both parties are rela-
tively young, in good health and each of the parties has 
permanent employment with substantial income. 
3. That the Court abused its discretion in requiring 
the Appellant to be responsible for one-half (1/2) of the 
necessary expenditures for capital improvements of the home, 
where the Respondent has the sole occupancy of the home, has 
more than a 50% interest in the equity upon sale of the home 
and can allow the home to become in disrepair and deterio-
rate with the Appellant being called upon to pay one-half 
(1/2) of said improvements as shall be determined by the 
Respondent necessary for the maintenance of the home. 
4. That the Court abused its discretion by failing to 
grant to the Appellant interest to be paid by the Respondent 
to the Appellant on the Appellant's equity in the home; by 
awarding the first $8,500.00 on the sale of the home to the 
Respondent; and decreeing division of the remaining equity 
on a 50/50 basis, or in the alternative, by not requiring a 
sale of the home, which is the only major asset in which the 
Appellant has been allowed to have an interest, accumulated 
in the marriage, and not requiring the home to be sold so 
that each of the parties could afford to purchase a home. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case wherein the Plaintiff and Appellant 
brought an action for divorce as against the Defendant and 
Respondent, with the Court awarding a Decree of Divorce to 
both of the parties, and the Lower Court made a division of 
the assets, together with a division of the retirement funds 
of the Appellant in a manner from which an Appeal has been 
made to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking a 
modification and reversal of the Lower Courts Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were intermarried on July 27, 1968 and 
there was born as the issue of the marriage two (2) child-
ren, Gregory Scott, born November 11, 1971 and Kenna 
Suzanne, born November 19, 1973. (TR 4) 
That subsequent to the marriage of the parties, the 
Appellant adopted Respondent's son, who at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce was emancipated. (TR 4) 
The Court ordered the Appellant to pay to the Respon-
dent $225.00 per month per child; made a division of the 
personal property of the parties; and awarded to each of the 
parties property possessed prior to the marriage or received 
from their respective family estates by inheritance. 
(R 80-83) 
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The Court awarded to the Respondent 
9/13 of one-half (1/2) of Appellant's retirement benefits 
from his previous employment at Sperry-Rand, and awarded to 
the Respondent one-half (1/2) of Appellant's Morton-Thiokol 
retirement benefits as and when received, multiplied by the 
fraction of 7, divided by the total number of Plaintiff's 
working years for Morton-Thiokol. (R 83) 
The Court then further made an award "that Plaintiff 
(Appellant) shall pay to the Defendant (Respondent) as and 
for alimony until the remarriage of Defendant (Respondent), 
or his property eligibility retirement from Morton-Thiokol 
Corporation, the sum of $400.00 per month, said alimony 
shall terminate upon the death of each party." (R 84) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Respondent having not requested nor prayed for 
alimony; being gainfully employed and having an income of 
$1,057.00 a month; having been awarded a savings account 
with a balance in excess of $11,000.00; having been awarded 
$400.00 a month alimony, together with child support in 
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Schedule of 
$225.00 monthly per child, and the Court ordering the con-
tinuation of the $400.00 a month alimony as being repre-
sentative of Respondent's share of Appellant's retirement 
fund from Sperry-Rand and also from Morton-Thiokol, where he 
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has been employed only seven (7) years, is a clear abuse of 
discretion and contrary to the previously established case 
law of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
2. The awarding of $400.00 a month alimony to a spouse 
who is gainfully employed with a substantial income and 
opportunity for advancement in her employment, and where the 
spouse has no physical disabilities evidenced in any manner 
before the Court, is 43 years of age, and such alimony to 
continue until the death of the Appellant, who is 46 years 
of age, is an abuse of discretion. 
3. The award to the Respondent of one-half (1/2) of 
the equity of the home, together with the possessory rights 
to said home and requiring the Appellant to pay 50% of all 
capital improvements and maintenance of the home is an abuse 
of discretion of the Court. 
4. The awarding of the equity of a home wherein there 
is an equity to be divided of $63,000.00 and which con-
stitutes the only major asset of the marriage allowed to be 
divided between the parties, without requiring the Respon-
dent to pay interest to the Appellant on Appellant's equity 
in the home, while at the same time, award to the Respondent 
of a share in the retirement of Appellant's previous employ-
ment is being enhanced as to the share to the Respondent by 
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the accumulation of interest and earnings of the retirement 
of Sperry-Rand, the previous employer of the Appellant, and 
the continued enhancement of the share of the Respondent's 
interest in Appellant's future retirement from his present 
employer of Morton-Thiokol being enhanced by the continued 
employment of the Appellant, is not equitable and is an 
abuse of discretion of the Court. 
ARG UMKNT 
POINT ONE 
THE AWARD OF $400.00 MONTHLY UPON RETIREMENT OF APPELLANT 
IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The Decree and Judgment of the Lower Court wherein the 
Court ordered the Appellant to pay to the Respondent the sum 
of $400,00 a month to terminate upon the death of either 
party is directly contrary to the holding of this Court in 
Woodward vs. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), (R 90) in 
that the Court has presumptuously assumed that the Respon-
dent's right to participate in 9/13 of the Appellant's 
employment at Sperry-Rand Corporation, and the current seven 
(7) years that the Appellant has been employed at Morton-
Thiokol (R 79) will, upon his retirement, entitled the 
Respondent to a share of the Appellant's retirement in the 
sum of not less than $800.00 a month or such greater sum as 
will entitle the Respondent to the fixed sum of $400.00 
6 
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without any basis of accounting or accountability as to what 
the retirement pension of the Appellant will be at 
of his retirement. 
The Court in Woodward vs. Woodwa rd, supra, 
Whether that resource is subject to 
distribution, does not turn on whether 
the spouse can presently use or control 
it, or on whether the resource can be 
given a present dollar value. The 
essential criterian is whether a right 
to the benefit or asset has accrued in 
whole or in part during the marriage. 
To the extent that the right has so 
accrued, it is subject to equitable 
distribution. 
POINT TWO 
AWARD TO EMPLOYED SPOUSE OF $400.00 MONTHLY ALIMONY FOR 
LIFE IS ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The Respondent, being gainfully employed at Morton-
Thiokol, and earning $1,057.37 monthly (TR 78); has not made 
any allegations of any health problems in any part of the 
record before the Court, and both the Respondent and the 
Appellant are in their forties, it is submitted that it is 
an abuse of discretion of the Court in making an alimony 
award of $400.00 monthly to continue until either of the 
parties has become demised. (R 85) 
I n W a r r e n
 IJLJL Warren, 655 P.2d 684, (Utah 1982), this 
Court established a criteria in determining the alimony and 
the time 
stated: 
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motor vehicle and has no savings account, while the Respon-
dent has a savings account in excess of $11,000.00 and has 
continuously, during her employment at Morton-Thiokol, 
applied $70.00 a pay day to a savings account. 
That both of the parties are gainfully employed, being 
both employed at Morton-Thiokol, and being both in the mid 
forties, with each of the parties being in good health. 
The Respondent has been awarded the home, with the 
Appellant being awarded one-half (1/2) of the equity in the 
home, subject to an additional sum of $8,500.00 being award-
ed to the Respondent, which will be discussed more fully in 
Point Four, infra. The youngest child is nine (9) years of 
age, and the Respondent has been awarded, by the Decree, the 
sum of $225.00 monthly per child, giving her an additional 
income of $450.00, which together with the income to Respon-
dent from her employment of $1,057.00 a month; $400.00 a 
month alimony; interest from her $11,000.00 savings, plus 
the $140.00 a month payroll deduction being saved by Respon-
dent in addition thereto from her employment at Morton-
Thiokol, and the awarding of the home to Respondent, with no 
interest or equity to the Appellant until the youngest child 
has reached the age of eighteen (the child now being nine 
years of age), and with the monthly payment on the home to 
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be borne by Respondent at $186.00 a month, (TR 69) consti-
tutes a significant high standard of living, substantially 
in excess of the style of living that the Respondent enjoyed 
prior to the divorce and award of the Court. 
While the duration of the marriage has been for sixteen 
(16) years, the Respondent's previous spouse had become 
demised, and the Appellant has furnished a home and full 
support of the entire household, including that of the 
Respondent's son, who was adopted by the Appellant following 
the marriage of the parties. 
It is further submitted to the Court that in determin-
ing the current standard of living an examination of the 
alleged expenses of the Respondent were set forth on a Order 
to Show Cause filed with the Lower Court on February 15, 
1984, alleging therein utilities of water, lights, garbage 
and heat at $120.00 a month; house payments of $200.00 a 
month, (which in fact is $186.00) and have not been in-
creased (TR 68-69); dentist of $20.00 a month whereas the 
medical plan at Thiokol provides for only a $50.00 deduct-
ible per year for medical services, which would make the 
cost of dental care at approximately $4.25 a month rather 
than $20.00 a month; drugs and vitamins listed at $40.00 a 
month, even though the Respondent testified that she and the 
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children are usually quite healthy; (TR 69) car expense and 
repairs and upkeep at $125.00 a month; food for the Respon-
dent and two (2) minor children of $500.00 a month, which 
was explained in the following dialogue: 
Q: Wouldn't you say $500.00 is a little 
bit ridiculous for food for three (3) 
people under those circumstances? 
A: Well, where do we count in ***we 
have to count other people who join us 
for meals as miscellaneous? 
Q: Does your husband have an obligation 
to support other- people who appear 
mi seellaneously? 
Clothing is claimed to be $100.00 a month and recreation 
$100.00 a month as well as other expenses $100.00 a month 
for a total allegation of possible expenses as set forth in 
the Show Cause Order of $1,305.00 a month. 
It is submitted that the maximum possible expenses of 
the Respondent would be more realistic at $800.00 a month 
rather than $1,305.00 a month as and for her total living 
costs, including the home payments, utilities and all other 
items set forth in the schedule at R 21. 
POINT THREE 
REQUIRING APPELLANT TO PAY ONE-HALF (1/2) OF CAPITAL 
REPAIRS TO HOME IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The Court in its Decree of Divorce ordered: 
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"The Defendant (Respondent), during her 
occupancy, is to maintain the home 
property, except for necessary expen-
ditures for capital improvements agreed 
upon by the parties or necessitated by 
ordinary wear or depletion, which im-
provements shall be paid one-half (1/2) 
by each party." (R 89) 
It is submitted to the Court that awarding the posses-
sion of the home to the Respondent and imposing upon the 
Appellant the responsibility to pay one-half (1/2) of the 
capital improvements for ordinary wear or depletion result-
ing from the use of the home by the Respondent, is an abuse 
of discretion and is unconscionable, since the Appellant has 
no control over the manner in which the Respondent uses and 
maintains the home, and that there being a total monthly 
payment on the home of $186.00, with possession of the home 
given to the Respondent, should impose a duty of proper care 
and maintenance of the home. 
It was mutually agreed between the parties to this 
cause of action that the home has a value of $80,000.00, (TR 
11) and it is submitted to the Court that ordinarily the 
rental use of the home of that value would be between 
$500.00 and $600.00 a month, whereas the actual amount to be 
paid by the Respondent is only $186.00 monthly for the prin-
cipal and interest in acquisition of ownership of the home. 
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The payment of such a nominal rent as the purchase 
price, together with a substantial benefits awarded to the 
Respondent by the Court to be paid by Appellant, constitutes 
an abuse of discretion of the Court to compel the Appellant, 
not a resident of the premises, nor the party who will 
ultimately become the owner of the premises, to pay one-half 
(1/2) of the costs of capital improvements and maintenance 
to prevent the premises from going into disrepair. 
POINT FOUR 
FAILURE OF THE COURT TO AWARD INTEREST ON THE HOME EQUITY 
TO APPELLANT AND ALLOWING CREDIT TO RESPONDENT OF FUTURE 
MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS FOR AN UNKNOWN PERIOD AS A FIRST 
DEDUCTION UPON SALE OF THE HOtViE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION 
The Court, in its Decree of Divorce, awarded to the 
Respondent, not only the right to the use and enjoyment of 
the home, subject to the usual conditions for payment of the 
equity of the Appellant to be vested and paid, but awarded 
as follows: 
"Upon termination of Defendant's right 
to live in the home, the proceeds from 
the home shall be divided as follows: 
$8,500.00 to the Defendant, an amount by 
which the present mortgage of $17,000.00 
is reduced at the time of the sale to 
the Defendant, the remainder of the net 
proceeds from the sale of the home to be 
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divided one-half (1/2) to each of the 
parties." (R 89) 
It is submitted to this Court that in the first in-
stance, the $8,500.00 specifically awarded to the Respondent 
(Defendant), contemplates that none of the other provisions 
which require payment to the Appellant of his equity in the 
home wi11 occur, except only upon the youngest child reach-
ing the age of emancipation. It is submitted to this Court 
that it is difficult to be so clairvoyant and presume that 
in a period of nine (9) years, the Respondent will not 
remarry, will not move or put the home up for sale, or will 
not cohabitate with another person, all of which would 
accelerate the requirement to pay to the Appellant his 
equity in the home. 
In addition to this totally inequitable award to the 
Respondent, the Court has further decreed, as has been set 
forth hereinabove, that the Appellant shall pay one-half 
(1/2) of the capital improvements and maintenance of the 
home, during the period of time that the Respondent shall be 
in possession of said home and prior to its vesting, and 
also denied to the Appellant the petition of Appellant to be 
paid interest on his equity of $34,000.00 in the home during 
the period that the Respondent shall be in possession of the 
home and prior to the sale of the home, which deprives the 
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Appellant of any opportunity to restart his life with the 
use of the equity which he has in the home and is the only 
major asset which the Court has not awarded to the Respon-
dent . 
I n p
°P e ysr Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978), the Court 
held at § 15-1-4 Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953, 
requires Judgments to bear interest at 8% per annum, and 
that the Court should have invoked also Section 30-3-5, 
which authorized the Court to make such orders in relation 
to the property of the parties as may be applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the 
Respondent, being gainfully employed and earning a substan-
tial monthly salary; having a substanial savings account; 
having being awarded $450.00 a month child support, is not 
entitled to $400.00 a month for the life of the Appellant, 
considering both of the parties are in their forties, and 
the further award to the Respondent of a specific sum of 
$400.00 a month from the time of retirement to the demise of 
the Appellant, without actually having knowledge as to the 
retirement pay of the Appellant, contrary to the previous 
Judgment of this Court; that the award to the Respondent of 
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$8,500.00 to be deducted from the sale of the home upon its 
sale is totally speculative upon the premise that nothing 
will occur to compel the payment to the Appellant of his 
equity in the home prior to the nine (9) year period of the 
emancipation of the youngest child and without regard to the 
other conditions which cause acceleration of the payment to 
a spouse of his equity in a home; that the award to the 
Respondent of one-half (1/2) of the costs of maintaining the 
home for any capital improvements thereupon, to be paid by 
the Appellant, who has no control whatsoever of the pre-
mises, and where the monthly purchase payment is $186.00, is 
an abuse of discretion of the Court and that it is uncon-
scionable not to award to the Appellant interest to be paid 
by the Respondent as long as the $34,000.00 equity of the 
Appellant in the home remains unpaid and unsatisfied, con-
sidering that the equity of the home of the Appellant is the 
only asset of any consequence of the marriage. The Court 
should reverse the Judgment of the Lower Court or make such 
17 
modifications as are conscionablc and equitable. 
Respectfully submitted this y day of April, 1985 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
ejig&tt fc YE AKOS V 
Attorney for plaintiff & 
Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
Statutes 
U.C.A. § 15-1-4 Interest on Judgments as amended 1981 
Any Judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall 
conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed 
upon by the parties, which shall be specified in 
the Judgment; other Judgments shall bear interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum. 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5 as amended 1984 
(1) When a Decree of Divorce is render-
ed, the Court may include in it such 
orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the mainten-
ance and health care of the parties and 
include in every Decree of Divorce an 
order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children. If coverage is 
available at a reasonable cost, the 
Court may also include an order requir-
ing the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital and dental 
care insurance for those children. The 
Court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support, 
maintenance and health and dental care, 
or the distribution of the property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary. 
Visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents and other relatives shall take 
into consideration the welfare of the 
child. 
(2) Unless a Decree of Divorce speci-
fically provides otherwise, any order of 
the Court that a party pay alimony to a 
19 
former spouse shall automatically 
terminate upon the remarriage of that 
former spouse, unless that marriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
in which case alimony shall resume, 
providing that the party paying alimony 
be made a party to the action of annul-
ment and that party's rights are deter-
mined. 
(3) Any order of the Court that a party 
pay alimony to a former spouse shall be 
terminated upon application of that 
party establishing that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the 
opposite sex, unless it is further 
established by the person receiving 
alimony that the relationship or asso-
ciation between them is without any 
sexual contact. 
Findings of Fact and Conelusions of Law 
Attached, Exhibit "A" 
Decree of Divorce 
Attached, Exhibit "B" 
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EXHIBIT "A' 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building* 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENTON W. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
SHARON S. STEPHENS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 18430 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
2Sth day of September, 1984, before the Honorable Craer J. 
Call, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appear-
ing in person and with her attorney, Frank hi. V/ells, and 
each of the parties having been sworn and testifying in 
their own behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, 
and certain stipulations having been made in open Court 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CUNCLLSICNS OF LA\. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
(5 
> ZZ. f j * -
- 5 Hi * 
I CD $ — 
H li Vi 5 
s p a r 5 "• * Til 
- A K Q 
- "* ^ CO 
concerning personal properties and other matters, and each 
of the respective attorneys having filed with the Court 
their written argument as to what the Court's decision 
should be, and the Court being fully cognizant of all mat-
ters pertaining therein and having rendered its Memorandum 
Decision in writing, and being fully informed in the pre-
mises, enters the folloxdng: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant have each been bona 
fide residents of Box Elder County, State of Utah for at 
least three (3) months prior to the commencement of this 
act ion. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant intermarried in 
Arlington, Texas on or about the 27th day of July, 1968 and 
ever since time have been and still are husband and wife; 
that there are two (2) children born as issue of the marri-
age and the Plaintiff adopted one (1) of the Defendants 
children by a previous marriage and that child is now eman-
cipated and there are two (2) minor children living at home, 
to-wit: Gregory Scott, born November 11, 1971 and Henna 
Suzanne, born November 19, 1973. 
3. That the Defendant shall be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the minor children, subject to rea-
sonable and liberal visitation, which the parties have 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA\. 
agreed should be every other weekend, commencing" Friday 
evening at 6:00 p.m. through Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m., 
ever}' other holiday, and that the Plaintiff may pick up the 
children at 6:00 p.m. the night before the holiday and keep 
them until 6:00 p.m. the day of the holiday, plus extended 
summer visitation of thirty (30) days, which may be broken 
up into two (2) fifteen (15) day periods if the Plaintiff 
elects, provided however the Plaintiff must give the Defen-
dant notice by May 30th when he intends on exercising his 
summer visitation. 
4. That the Defendant is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor children, provided however that if 
either of them elect to reside permanently with the Plain-
tiff, such election shall be deemed a substantial change of 
circumstance, and thus leave only for determination the best 
interest of the child or children in any future custody 
proceedings• 
5. That the Plaintiff is presently employed at Morton 
Thiokol and has a gross salary of $3,800.00 per month with a 
net take home pay of $2,365.00 per month; and the Defendant 
is employed at Morton Thiokol with a gross salary of 
$1,058.00 per month and $788.00 take home pay. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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6. That Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sun 
of $225.00 per month per child, the same to be effective as 
a continuation of the temporary child support obligation, 
and Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the children as 
dependents for income tax purposes. 
7. That during the course of the marriage, the parties 
herein have acquired both real and personal properties, 
which the Court finds have the following valuations: An 
equity in a family home valued at $63,000,00; a 1980 Toyota 
automobile valued at $3,500.00; a 1969 Chevrolet truck 
valued at $300.00; a 1965 Volkswagen valued at 250.00; a 
canoe valued at $150.00; a camper shell valued at $150.00; 
cab over camper valued at $250.00; four (4) horse trailers 
valued at $750.00; tools valued at $200.00; guns and sport-
ing equipment valued at $1,000.00; utility trailer valued at 
$200.00; cash value of insurance invested in stock valued at 
$3,800.00; two (2) horses valued at $1,200.00; horse para-
phernalia valued at $1,050.00; lawn and yard equipment 
valued at $400.00; household furniture valued at $1,500.00; 
washer ana dryer valued at $500.00; freezer valued at 
$2 00.00; dishwasher valued at $100.00; refrigerator valued 
at $350.00. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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8. That the defendant brought into the marriage 
$19,500.00 in the f o ;*m of cash deposit; Plaintiff brought 
into the marriage ii. the form of vehicles, horses and a 
savings account of ,-1,000.00, a total of $14,500.00, each 
claims the contributions have been consumed in the course of 
the marriage. 
9. That Plaintiff has a vested interest in a pension 
with Sperry-Rand Corporation for thirteen (13) years employ-
ment, nine (9) year; of v/hich occurred during the parties 
marriage. 
10. That Plaintiff has seven (7) years employment with 
Morton Thiokol and a pension retirement program based there-
on. 
11. That the Plaintiff introduced into Court an exhibit 
concerning items ol personal property that the Defendant 
agreed to, and the lourt has made a determination of those 
items in dispute. 
12. That the Defendant has requested alimony be awarded 
to her. 
13. That the Defendant has retained Attorney Frank M. 
l,"e 1 1 s to represent her and has incurred reasonable attor-
ney's fees and the Plaintiff has retained Attorney Pete N. 
Viahos to represent him and has incurred reasonable attor-
ney's fees. 
14. That the Lefendant has treated the Plaintiff cruel-
ly, and that the Plaintiff has treated the Defendant cruel-
ly, causing; further marital relations between the parties 
herein intolerable. 
From the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff, Kenton vV. Stephens, is entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Sharon S. 
Stephens, and the Defendant, Sharon S. Stephens, is entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, Kenton v7. 
Stephens, said divorce to become final upon the signing and 
entry. 
2. That the Defendant shall be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the two (2) minor children, subject 
to reasonable and liberal visitation upon the condition that 
in the event the minor children, or either of them, elect to 
reside permanently with the Plaintiff, such election shall 
be deemed a substantial change of circumstance and thus 
leave only for determination the best interest of the child 
or children in any future custody proceedings. 
3. That the parties have stipulated since the Memoran-
dum Decision that said visitation be set out as follows: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAU 6 
Plaintiff be allowed to have the children every other week-
end from Friday at 5:00 p.m. through Sunday at 7:00 p.m., 
every other holiday, provided however that if it is Plain-
tiff's holiday, he may pick up the children the night before 
the holiday at 5:00 and return them on the holiday at 7:00, 
extended summer visitation of thirty (30) days which may be 
broken into two (2) fifteen (15) day periods if Plaintiff 
elects, provided however the Plaintiff must give the Defen-
dant notice by May 30th of each year when he intends on 
exercising the visitation, with Plaintiff to have Father's 
Day regardless of whose weekend and Defendant to have 
Mother's Day regardless of whose weekend, and that the 
holidays shall control over the weekend visitation. 
4. That the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the 
sum of $225.00 per month per child as and for support, 
provided however the Plaintiff shall be entitled just be-
tween the parties to claim the children as dependents for 
income tax purposes. 
5. That the Plaintiff shall be awarded the following 
items of personal property with value placed on the Court as 
follows: The 1969 Chevrolet truck valued at $800.00; the 
19 65 Volkswagen valued at $25 0.00; canoe valued at $15 0.00; 
camper shell valued at $150.00; cab over camper valued at 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV* 7 
$250.00, four (4) horse trailers valued at $750.00; horses 
and paraphernalia valued at $2,250.00; tools valued at 
$200.00; guns and sporting equipment valued at $1,000.00; 
utility trailer valued at $200.00; stock valued at 
$3,800.00. 
6. That the Defendant shall be awarded the following 
items of personal property, to-wit: the household furni-
ture, fixtures, etc. valued at $1,500.00; washer and dyrer 
valued at $500.00; freezer valued at $200.00; dishwasher 
valued at $100.00; refrigerator valued at $350.00; Toyota 
automobile valued at $3,500.00; incidental items including 
camera, endurance saddle, blue tent, one (1) set of bun!: 
cots, a 22 rifle from her father, a lawn mower and tools 
from her father valued at $150.00. 
7. That the Plaintiff shall also be awarded those 
items of personal property including tools and equipment 
that were from his fatherfs estate which were set forth in 
Plaintiff's exhibit and y/hich the Defendant stipulated to as 
his sole and separate property. 
8. That the federal income tax that the parties 
received shall be divided equally between the parties. 
9. That the Defendant shall have the right to the use 
of the home and the equity therein, subject to the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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terms: Defendant shall have the right to live in the hone 
until the youngest child reaches majority, her remarriage or 
sale of the property, whichever occurs first. Upon termina-
tion of Defendants right to live in the home, the proceeds 
from the home shall be divided as follows: $8,500.00 to the 
Defendant, an amount by which the present mortgage of 
$17,000.00 is reduced at the time of the sale to the Defen-
dant, the remainder of the net proceeds from the sale of the 
home to be divided one-half (£) to each of the parties. The 
Defendant, during her occupancy, is to maintain the home 
property, except for necessary expeditures for capital 
improvements agreed upon by the parties or necessitated by 
ordinary wear or depletion, which improvements shall be paid 
one-half (-}) by each party. Defendant to pay and discharge 
as due the mortgage payments, taxes and insurance on said 
home. 
10. That the Defendant shall also be entitled to 
received one-half (I) of nine thirteenths of Plaintiff's 
Sperry Rand Retirement benefits as and when they are 
received by the Plaintiff. That Defendant is also to 
receive one-half (i) of Plaintiff's Morton Thiokol retire-
ment benefits as and when received, multiplied by the frac-
tion of seven (7) divided by the total number of Plaintiff's 
working years for r.iorton Thiokol. 
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11, That Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as and 
for alimony until the remarriage of Defenaant or his pro-
perty eligibility retirement from Morton Thiokol Corporation 
the sura of $400,00 per month, said alimony shall terminate 
upon the death of each party. 
12. That each of the parties shall assume and pay their 
own attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this day of December, 1984. 
OMER J. CALL, 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
FRANK TVI. \vELLS, 
Attornev for Defendant 
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PETS N. VLAHOS 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building1 
244 7 Kiesel Avenue 
Cgden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
CEO 
EXHIBIT "B" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENTON W. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHARON S. STEPHENS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil Mo. 18430 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
23th day of September, 1984, before the Honorable Cmer J. 
Call, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting 
v/ithout a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appear-
ing in person and with her attorney, Frank M. Le11s , and 
each of the parties having been sworn and testifying in 
their own behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, 
and certain stipulations having been made in open Court 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
EXHIBIT "B 
concerning; personal properties and other matters, and each 
of the respective attorneys having filed with the Court 
their written argument as to what the Court Ts decision 
should be, and the Court being fully cognizant of all mat-
ters pertaining* therein and having rendered its Memorandum 
Decision in writing, and being fully informed in the pre-
mises, and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Lav;, enters the follwoing Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff, Kenton W. Stephens, is granted 
a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Sharon S. Stephens, 
and the Defendant, Sharon S. Stephens, is granted a Decree 
of Divorce frcm the Plaintiff, Kenton V.\ Stephens, said 
divorce to become final upon the signing and entry. 
2. That the Defendant is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the two (2) minor children, subject to reasonable 
and liberal visitation upon the condition that'in the event 
the minor children, or either of them, elect to reside 
permanently with the Plaintiff, such election shall be 
deemed a substantial change of circumstance and thus leave 
only for determination the best interest of the child or 
children in any future custody proceedings. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE } 
3. That the parties have stipulated since the Memoran-
dum Decision that said visitation be set out as follows: 
Plaintiff is allowed to have the children every other week-
end from Friday at 5:00 p.m. through Sunday at 7:00 p.m., 
every other holiday, provided however that if it is Plain-
tiff's holiday, he may pick up the children the night before 
the holiday at 5:00 and return them on the holiday at 7:00, 
extended summer visitation of thirty (30) days which may be 
broken into two (2) fifteen (15) day periods if Plaintiff 
elects, provided however the Plaintiff must give the Defen-
dant notice by May 30th of each year when he intends on 
exercising the visitation, with Plaintiff to have FatherTs 
Day regardless of whose weekend and Defendant to have 
Mother Ts Day regardless of whose weekend, and that the 
holidays shall control over the weekend visitation. 
4. That the Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Defen-
dant the sum of $225.00 per month per child as and for 
support, provided however the Plaintiff is entitled just be-
tween the parties to claim the children as dependents for 
income tax purposes. 
5. That the Plaintiff is awarded the following items 
ot personal property with value placed on the Court as 
follows: The 19fi() Chevrolet truck valued at $800.00; the 
DECREE OF DIVOUCH 3 
19o5 Volkswagen valued at $250.00; canoe valued at $150.00; 
camper shell valued at $150.00; cab over camper valued at 
$250.00, four (4) horse trailers valued at $750.00; horses 
and paraphernalia valued at $2,250.00; tools valued at 
$200.00; guns and sporting equipment valued at $1,000.00; 
utility trailer valued at $200.00; stock valued at 
S3 ,800.00. 
6. That the Defendant is awarded the following items 
of personal property, to-wit: the household furniture, 
fixtures, etc. valued at 31,500.00; washer and dyrer valued 
at $500.00; freezer valued at $200.00; dishwasher valued at 
$100.00; refrigerator valued at $350.00; Toyota automobile 
valued at $3,500.00; incidental items including camera, 
endurance saddle, blue tent, one (1) set of bunk cots, a 22 
rifle from her father, a lawn mower and tools from her 
father valued at S150.00. 
7. That the Plaintiff is also awarded those items of 
personal property including tools and equipment that were 
from his fatherTs estate which were set forth in Plaintiff's 
exhibit and which the Defendant stipulated to as his sole 
and separate property. 
8. That the federal income tax that the parties 
received shall be divided equally between the parties. 
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9. That the Defendant shall have the right to the use 
of the home and the equity therein, subject to the following 
terms: Defendant shall have the right to live in the home 
until the youngest child reaches majority, her remarriage or 
sale of the property, whichever occurs first. Upon termina-
tion of Defendant's right to live in the home, the proceeds 
from the home shall be divided as follows: $8,500,00 to the 
Defendant, an amount by which the present mortgage of 
$17,000.00 is reduced at the time of the sale to the Defen-
dant, the remainder of the net proceeds from the sale of the 
home to be divided one-half (i) to each of the parties. The 
Defendant, during her occupancy, is to maintain the hone 
property, except for necessary expeditures for capital 
improvements agreed upon by the parties or necessitated by 
ordinary wear or depletion, which improvements shall be paid 
one-half (^ ) by each party. Defendant to pay and discharge 
as due the mortgage payments, taxes and insurance on said 
home . 
10. That the Defendant is also entitled to received 
one-half (A) of nine thirteenths of Plaintiff's Spcrry Rand 
Retirement benefits as and when they are received by the 
Plaintiff. That Defendant is also to receive one-half (:) 
of Plaintiff's Morton Thiokol retirement benefits as and 
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when received, multiplied by the fraction of seven (7) 
divided by the total number of PlaintiffTs working years for 
Worton Thiokol. 
11. That Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Defendant 
as and for alimony until the remarriage of Defendant or his 
property eligibility retirement from Morton Thiokol Corpora-
tion the sum of $400.00 per month, said alimony shall term-
inate upon the death of each party. 
12. That each of the parties are ordered to assume and 
pay their own attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this cT/ day of December, 1984. 
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OMER J. CALL," 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
FRANK MT WELLS", 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
There comes now counsel for the Plaintiff and Appellant 
and certifies to the Court that fifteen (15) copies of the 
AppellantTs Brief was posted and delivered to the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 332 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 34114, and that four (4) 
copies were mailed to the attorney for the Defendant and 
Respondent, Frank Wells, Esq., at 2564 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah 84401 on this - /> day of April, 1985. 
Attorney/for Plaintiff & 
Appellant 
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